UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA MIDDLE DIVISION

MELINDA M. LANGDON,)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
vs.)	Case No. CV-08-S-238-M
)	
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,)	
Commissioner, Social Security)	
Administration,)	
)	
Defendant.)	

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Claimant, Melinda Langdon, commenced this action on February 8, 2008, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner, affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), and thereby denying her claim for a period of disability, disability insurance, and supplemental security income benefits. For the reasons stated herein, the court finds that the Commissioner's ruling is due to be affirmed.

The court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of review is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the Commissioner, and whether correct legal standards were applied. *See Lamb v. Bowen*, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988); *Tieniber v. Heckler*, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253

(11th Cir. 1983).

Claimant contends that the Commissioner's decision is neither supported by substantial evidence nor in accordance with applicable legal standards. Specifically, claimant asserts that the ALJ improperly considered her subjective complaints of pain. Upon review of the record, the court concludes that contention is without merit.

To demonstrate that pain renders her disabled, claimant must "produce 'evidence of an underlying medical condition and (1) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (2) that the objectively determined medical condition is of such severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain." *Edwards v. Sullivan*, 937 F. 2d 580, 584 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting *Landry v. Heckler*, 782 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986)). If an ALJ discredits subjective testimony on pain, "he must articulate explicit and adequate reasons." *Hale v. Bowen*, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing *Jones v. Bowen*, 810 F.2d 1001, 1004 (11th Cir. 1986); *MacGregor v. Bowen*, 786 F.2d 1050, 1054 (11th Cir. 1986)).

The ALJ in the present case properly applied these legal principles. He found that claimant suffered from severe impairments, including fibromyalgia, mild lumbar degenerative changes, status post lumbar back surgery, history of drug abuse, and generalized anxiety disorder.¹ He concluded that, while claimant's fibromyalgia,

¹Tr. at 17.

lumbar disease, and history of back surgery could reasonably be expected to produce the pain symptoms she alleged, claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely credible, as they were not supported by the medical evidence of record. *See Marbury v. Sullivan*, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992) ("*After* considering a claimant's complaints of pain, the ALJ may reject them as not creditable, and that determination will be reviewed for substantial evidence.") (citing *Wilson v. Heckler*, 734 F.2d 513, 517 (11th Cir. 1984)) (emphasis supplied). Specifically, the ALJ noted that, while claimant was prescribed pain medication, she did not report persistent severe pain to her doctors, she did not consistently exhibit pain behaviors during examination, and her pain symptoms were well controlled with medication. These conclusions were supported by substantial evidence.

Consistent with the foregoing, the court concludes the ALJ's decision was based upon substantial evidence and in accordance with applicable legal standards. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. Costs are taxed against claimant. The Clerk is directed to close this file.

DONE this 31st day of October, 2008.

United States District Judge